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NOTES
PARDEN v. TERMINAL RY. OF ALA. STATE DOCKS
DEP'T: THE PASSING OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Undeterred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States
Supreme Court by a 5-4 majority in Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State
Docks Dep't,1 held that a state that owns and operates a railroad in interstate
commerce may not successfully plead sovereign immunity as a defense in a
suit brought against the railroad by its employees under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act.2 The doctrine of sovereign immunity-the principal
that a state may not be sued by an individual without its consent-is embodied
in the eleventh amendment3 with respect to federal court suits brought by a
citizen of another state. It was extended to federal court suits brought by
a state's own citizens in Hans v. Louisiana.4
Petitioners, citizens of Alabama,5 brought suit against the Terminal Rail-
way of the Alabama State Docks Department in a federal district court to
recover damages under the FELA for personal injuries sustained while
employed by the railway. The railway was engaged in interstate commerce at
the time of the injury.6 The railway has been operated since 1927, when the
Alabama Legislature, pursuant to constitutional authority,7 authorized its
1. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
2. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958) provides in part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . .. for such injury or
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.
4. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
5. The Court would have reached the same result even if the petitioners were
citizens of another state and the suit came squarely within the language of the eleventh
amendment.
6. Originally, in order for an employee to recover under the FELA the company
had to be engaged in interstate commerce and the employee at the time of the injury
must have been employed in such commerce. Lamphere v. Oregon R.R. & Navigation,
193 Fed. 248, 249-56 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1911). Today, under a 1939 amendment, the
FELA brings within its scope not only those employees whose work at the time of injury
was in actual interstate commerce or a part of it, but any employee whose work
furthered interstate commerce, or in any way affected such commerce directly, closely
and substantially. Ermin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 F. Supp. 936, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
7. ALA. CONST. amend. 12, § 93 (1901); ALA. CONST. amend. 116 (1901).
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State Docks Department to "acquire, .. . control and operate a line of terminal
railways and carry passengers, goods, wares and merchandise . . . as though
it were a common carrier." s Jurisdiction of the district court was based on the
FELA which gives concurrent jurisdiction to both state and federal courts.9
Alabama, appearing specially, moved for dismissal on the ground of sovereign
immunity. This motion was granted and upheld by the court of appeals. 10
The Supreme Court reversed holding that Alabama had waived its immunity
by operating the railway in interstate commerce.
In order to determine whether the Court has infringed upon the effec-
tiveness of the defense of sovereign immunity, an excursus behind the historical
development of the eleventh amendment and the Hans doctrine is necessary.
The purpose of this Note is to examine whether Congress, in enacting the
FELA, actually intended to subject a state to suit under these circumstances
and if so, whether Congress has the power to do so.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Even before the ratification of the Constitution there was much concern
over the suability of a state. As drafted at the Constitutional Convention, the
judicial power of the United States extended "to controversies . . . between
a State and citizens of another State."" Alexander Hamilton, 12 John Mar-
shall's and James Madison, 14 in supporting the adoption of this provision,
8. ALA. CODE tit. 38, § 17 (1958).
9. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
10. 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963).
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2(1) provides:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to
controversies between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States,
citizens or subjects.
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 450 (Smith ed. 1901) (Hamilton), wherein
Hamilton said:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there
is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Convention, it will remain with
the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. . . . The contracts
between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the
sovereign, and have no pretentions to a compulsive force. They confer no right
of action independent of the sovereign's will.
13. John Marshall at the Virginia Convention said:
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another state, its
jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gentleman
will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. Is there no
such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legislature of
Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational that the
sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable
states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. . . . [H]ow
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attempted to allay the fears that this clause would enable citizens of one state
to sue another state. The issue was resolved in Chisholm v. Georgia,'15 where
a divided Court held that a citizen of one state had the right to sue another
state in assumpsit.16 The decision evoked such objection that the eleventh
amendment, whose effect would be to reverse Chisholm, 17 was proposed within
a year and ratified in 1798. The amendment explicitly excluded suits against
a state brought by citizens of another state.' 8 There was no mention of suits
brought against a state in a federal court by one of its own citizens. Actually
the Constitution had never provided for such a suit.
The question, nonetheless, arose nearly a century later in the Hans case.
The plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, sued Louisiana to recover the proceeds
from state issued bonds, which were later repudiated by the Legislature.
Plaintiff contended the repudiation of the bonds was in violation of the
constitutional provision that "no state shall ... pass any law ... impairing the
obligation of contracts."'19 Since the action arose under the Constitution, the
plaintiff argued that the federal court had the power to adjudicate his claim.
The Court held that the judicial power of the federal courts did not extend
to such controversies 20 for the spirit of the eleventh amendment necessarily
barred such suits.
2 '
could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, without the
establishment of these tribunals?
III ELLioT, DEBATES 555-56 (1836).
14. James Madison similarly met the objections of Patrick Henry and George
Mason at the Virginia Convention, where he said:
It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only
operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a
citizen [of another state], it must be brought before a federal court.
III, ELLIOT, DEBATES 553 (1836). In fact, the New York and Rhode Island ratification
messages sent to Congress expressed their concern over the question of the suability of
a state in a federal court. I ELLIOT, DEBATES 337-39 (1836).
15. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
16. Justices Jay, Blair, Wilson, and Cushing based their conclusion that Georgia
was suable on the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over controversies between a
"State and a citizen of another State." Justice Wilson also rejected the sovereign im-
munity theory. Having debated Marshall and Madison at the Virginia convention, he
took the position of nationalism: "As to the purpose of the Union, therefore, Georgia is
not a sovereign." Id. at 457. Justice Ingrel, the lone dissenter, felt that Georgia was
entitled to the immunity enjoyed by the English Crown. Id. at 429-50.
17. Although the amendment proposal was passed by an overwhelming vote, un-
successful attempts were made on the floor of the Senate and the House to modify
the effects of the amendment. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 30, 476 (1794).
18. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378, 382 (1798).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
20. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-21 (1890). See also Ex Parte New York,
256 U.S. 490 (1921) ; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
21. It has also been held that the eleventh amendment applies to cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. E.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-99 (1920);
Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. 627 (1883). Suits by one state against another state on
behalf of its own citizens is necessarily barred by the eleventh amendment. E.g., North
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Thus, the eleventh amendment and Hans exemplify the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, for as a sovereign a state is entitled to immunity not only in its
own courts,' but also in federal court suits brought by any individual.
It is clear, therefore, that a State has the same constitutional im-
munity from suit by its own citizens as it has in suits brought against
it by citizens of other States, and the courts will apply the same tests
in determining whether the State has waived its immunity against its
own citizens as it would apply if the suits were by a citizen of another
State.
23
The doctrine of sovereign immunity seemingly rests upon the misap-
plication of the English maxim that "the King can do no wrong."2 4 In other
attempts at rationalization, the Court has rested the doctrine upon public
policy2 and upon the maxim that "there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. '26 Suffice it to say
that a state sovereignty27 is immune from the suits of an individual to which
it has not consented 28 or otherwise waived its right to immunity.29 This im-
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76
(1833).
22. See Copeland & Screws, Governmental Responsibility for Tort in Alabama, 13
ALA. L. REV. 296, 301-09 (1961).
23. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 311 F.2d at 731.
24. This maxim is pointless where there is no king. Lansford v. United States,
101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). For an exhaustive eight series survey of this legal maxim and
its misapplication to the doctrine of sovereign immunity see Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort I-VIII, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924) ; 34
YALE L.J. 329 (1925) ; 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); 36 YALE L.J. 757 (1927) ; 36 YALE L.J.
1039 (1927); 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577 (1928); 28 COLUm. L. REv. 734 (1928).
25. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868):
The doctrine rests upon public policy; the inconvenience and danger which would
follow from any different rule. It is obvious that public service would be hindered,
and public safety endangered. . . . The exemption from direct suit is therefore
without exception.
Id. at 154. See also Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269, 275 (1868); Nichols v.
United States, 74 U.S. 122, 126 (1868).
26. Kawananhoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
27. For a general discussion on state sovereignty see the twelve series study by
Professor Murphy which began with State Sovereignty Prior to the Constitution, 29
Miss. L.J. 115 (1958) ; continued with State Sovereignty and the Fathers, 30 Miss. L.J.
135 (1959) ; 30 Miss. L.J. 261 (1959) ; and 31 Miss. L.J. 50 (1959) ; continued with
State Sovereignty and the Drafting of the Constitution, 31 Miss. L.J. 203 (1960) ; 32
Miss. L.J. 1 (1960); 32 Miss. L.J. 155 (1961) ; and 32 Miss. L.J. 227 (1961) ; and
continued with State Sovereignty and the Ratification of the Constitution, 33 Miss. L.J.
29 (1961) ; 33 Miss. L.J. 164 (1962) ; and 33 Miss. L.J. 294 (1962) ; and concluded with
State Sovereignty and the Constitution-A Summary View, 33 Miss. L.J. 353 (1962).
28. E.g., Great No. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1943) ; Duhne v. New
Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 314 (1920) ; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 524 (1899) ; Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). Cf. Moraco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1933).
29. "Waiver" and "consent" are seemingly used interchangeably. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1944). It would appear that
"consent" would be used to indicate expressed permission, whereas "waiver" would apply
to cases of implied consent.
1965]
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munity is absolute and unqualified. 30 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the
majority in Parden, insists that "it remains the law that a state may not be
sued by an individual without its consent. Our conclusion is simply that
Alabama . .. consented."'3
CONSENT TO SUIT: WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
How does a state consent to suit? Four states cannot be made defendants
in any action by their constitutions ;32 five other states have established boards
to consider these claims;33 and the remaining states may consent to suit
in their own courts by statute, 34 but such consent will not necessarily be
consent to suit in a federal court.35 Consent must be strictly construed 36 and
may be predicated upon conditions or even withdrawn.37 By its constitution
Alabama may not be made a defendant in any action ;38 therefore, this
precludes the majority from finding any express or implied consent by statute.
A state may also waive its right to immunity in a federal court by a
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. In Clark v. Barnard,39 Rhode
Island, by appearing in a federal court and prosecuting a claim for the funds
in controversy, became a party to the litigation and was therefore subject
to the opposing parties' claims to the fund. 40 Since Alabama appeared specially
to contest federal court jurisdiction,41 the majority in Parden could not have
found that sovereign immunity was waived by submission to jurisdiction.
State courts have held that a state may waive its immunity under state
law from tort liability when it enters into proprietary activities.42 Where a
30. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 101 U.S. 1 (1891).
31. 377 U.S. at 192.
32. E.g., ALA. CONST. art I, § 14. See generally Comment, Administration of Claims
Against the Sovereign, 68 HARV. L. REV. 506, 507 (1955).
33. Ibid.
34. E.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Gunter
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1905) ; Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 527, 531 (1857).
35. State statutes permitting individuals to sue the state in "any court of competent
jurisdiction" have been held not to confer jurisdiction on federal courts. Kennecott Copper
Co. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 465-66 (1944) ; Great No. Ins. Go. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47, 54-56 (1943) ; Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904).
36. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1908).
37. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 530 (1857).
38. ALA. CONsr. art. I, § 14.
39. 108 U.S. 18 (1933).
40. Id. at 445. See also Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
41. Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure there is no longer a need
for appearing specially to protect the jurisdiction of the court. See generally 1A BARRON
& HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 343 (1960).
42. See Pianka v. State, 46 Cal. App. 2d 208, 293 P.2d 458 (1956); Holmes v.
Erie County, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243, aff'd, 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E.2d 369
(1943). Contra, Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944);
Holzworth v. State, 238 Wis. 63, 298 N.W. 163 (1941).
[Vol. 69
NOTES
state engages in a private business it divests itself of its sovereign character
and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of retaining its privileges and im-
munities, it descends to the level of a private citizen and hence, cannot claim
the privileges or immunities of a sovereign.43 This principle was clearly es-
tablished in Western & Atlantic RR v. Carlton,44 where the court said:
When a State embarks in an enterprise which is usually carried on by
individual persons or companies, it voluntarily waives its sovereign
character and is subject to like regulation with persons engaged in
the same calling .... [TJhe State engaging in the carrying business,
assumes the obligations and liabilities incident to that business when
carried on by individuals.
45
The proprietary-governmental distinction has been applied to determine
whether a state has waived its immunity from suit brought under state law
by an individual in its own courts. 46 No decision has indicated whether this
distinction would permit a suit in a federal court. It would seem that the
proprietary nature of the activity alone would not be sufficient to give the
federal courts jurisdiction in view of the constitutional immunity embodied
in the eleventh amendment and the Hans doctrine. This can be assumed from
the policy announced in United States v. California:
47
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its rail-
road in its "sovereign" or in its "private" capacity. That in operating
its railroad it is acting within a power reserved to the states cannot
be doubted .... The only question we need consider is whether the
exercise of that power, in whatever capacity, must be in subordina-
tion to the power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been
granted specifically to the national government.
48
Therefore, it cannot be said in the Parden case that Alabama waived its im-
munity from suit in a federal court simply because it engaged in a proprietary
function. It is immaterial whether Alabama's operation of an interstate
railroad is classified as proprietary or governmental; even if the operation of
the railroad was held to be a governmental function, Alabama would still
be answerable to actions brought under the FELA.
The Parden court concluded that:
[1.] By adopting and ratifying the Commerce clause, the States em-
43. Cf. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), wherein the rule
was established that the state's immunity from taxation is "limited to those [activities]
which are of a strictly governmental character and does not extend to those which are
used by the state in the carrying on of an ordinary private business." Id. at 461.
44. 28 Ga. 180 (1859).
45. Id. at 182-83. (Emphasis added.)
46. See cases cited note 42 supra.
47. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
48. Id. at 186.
1965]
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powered Congress to create such a right of action [as the
FELA] against interstate railroad;
[2.] [B]y enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power,
Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in inter-
state commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as
provided by the Act;
[3.] [B]y thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce,
Alabama must be taken to have accepted that condition and
thus to have consented to suit.
49
There can be no denying that Congress has the power "to regulate com-
merce ... among the several states," 50 and that this power is complete 5' and
plenary.5 2 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in examining the term "to regulate
commerce" in Gibbon v. Ogden,53 said:
What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe
the rules by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the Constitution.
54
In accord with this power Congress enacted the FELA. Although the
first attempt at such legislation was declared unconstitutional, 55 the validity
of the second measure was upheld in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 56
where the Court announced that "Congress has not exceeded its powers
by prescribing the regulations embodied in the present act."'57
DID CONGRESS INTEND TO SUBJECT A STATE TO SUIT UNDER THE FELA
One of the conditions embodied in the FELA is the amenability of an
interstate railroad to suit in a federal court. 58 A further analysis of this second
postulate on which the majority rests its opinion reveals the question of
whether Congress, in enacting the FELA, actually intended to condition a
state's operation of an interstate railroad on its waiver of sovereign immunity.
Both the legislative history of the FELA and the language of the act are sus-
ceptible to conflicting interpretations.
49. 377 U.S. at 192.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
51. See North Am. Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 327 U.S. 686, 704-06 (1945).
52. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434-37 (1945).
53. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
54. Id. at 196. (Emphasis added.)
55. Howard v. Illinois R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
56. 223 U.S. 1 (1911). This was an action by a citizen of Connecticut against a
railroad corporation of that state to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the
plaintiff while in the defendent's service.
57. Id. at 53.
58. 35 Stat. 66 (1908). 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
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A perusal of the legislative history shows that Congress never contem-
plated the applicability of the act to a state.5 9 Its primary purpose was to
eliminate the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, contract not to sue, and the fellow servant rule.60 Since the act was
described as only having "changed four rules of the common law,"' 6 1 it neces-
sarily follows that sovereign immunity, not being one of the four defenses
explicitly removed, remains as a defense to actions brought under the FELA
against a state owned and operated railroad.
Moreover, it must be noted that consent by a state will not be lightly
inferred,62 but only found where a state has consented in clear and precise
language.63 By analogy it is submitted that the Court should not permit Con-
gress to foist a waiver on a state unless Congress has indicated its intention
by clear and precise language. If Congress desired to condition a state's oper-
ation of an interstate railroad on its waiver of sovereign immunity, it should
have done so expressly so that the states would have been apprised of the
option in the FELA. Since a "waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege," 64 it follows that a state must know of the condition
before it can accept. The language of the FELA does not suggest any such
condition to a state. Therefore, Alabama should not be said to have consented
to suit.
Finally, the language in United States v. United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica,6 5 indicates that "there is an old and well-known rule that statutes which
in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to
the sovereign without express words to that effect."' 66 The dissent in Parden
said :
It should not be easily inferred that Congress, in legislating pursuant
to one article of the Constitution, intended to effect on automatic
and compulsory waiver of rights arising under another. Only when
Congress has clearly declared that any State which undertakes given
59. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908); 42 CONG. REC. 4427
(1908).
60. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) ; Slaughter v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 302 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 827 (1962).
61. 42 CONG. REc. 4427 (1908) (remarks of Representative Henry of Texas).
62. See Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1908).
63. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 468-70
(1944).
64. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
65. 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
66. Id. at 272. It has also been held that a sovereign is not bound by the general
language of a statute which tends to restrain or diminish the powers, rights or interests
of the sovereign, unless the sovereign is expressly mentioned in the statute. Guarantee
Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152, 155 (1912) ; United States
v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251, 263 (1873).
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regulable conduct will be deemed thereby to have waived its immu-
nity should courts disallow the invocation of this defense [of sov-
ereign immunity].67
On the other hand, however, the Court has applied the Federal Safety
Appliance Act 6s and the Railway Labor Act69 to state owned and operated
railroads. The FSAA applicable by its terms to "any common carrier engaged
in interstate commerce by railroad," was unanimously held to apply to Cali-
fornia's state owned railroad in United States v. California.70 Here, the United
States sued California to recover the statutory penalty of $100 for a violation
of the FSAA. After dismissing California's contention that it was engaged in
a "governmental" function as being immaterial, the Court held that the danger
sought to be corrected by the FSAA existed in a state owned railroad as
much as in a privately owned railroad. The Court dismissed the contention
that the FSAA was inapplicable to state owned railroad because the act didn't
specifically mention them, saying:
We can perceive no reason for extending it so as to exempt a busi-
ness carried on by the state from the otherwise applicable provisions
of an act of Congress, all-embracing in scope and national in its pur-
pose, which is as capable of being obstructed by states as by individual
action. Language and objectives so plain are not to be thwarted by
resort to a rule of construction whose purpose is but to resolve
doubts, and whose application in the circumstances would be highly
artificial.
71
The California case and the Parden case are distinguishable. The California
case involved a suit prosecuted by the United States. Such suits are within
the judicial power of the federal government. 72 In essence the Court merely
had to decide whether Congress intended to subject a state to suit by the
United States. In Parden, however, one of the issues before the Court was
whether Congress intended that a state could be subjected to suit by an indi-
vidual in a federal court if it operated a railroad in interstate commerce. Such
suits are not cognizable in a federal court without the consent of the state, for
the Hans case specifically prohibits suits brought against a state by its own
citizens, and the eleventh amendment bars suits brought by citizens of other
states. Therefore, before Alabama is divested of this right, resort should be
made to the rule of construction as applied in the United Mineworkers case.
The majority also relied on California v. Taylor,78 where it was held that
67. 377 U.S. at 198-99 (dissenting opinion).
68. 27 Stat. 531 (1896), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-46 (1958).
69. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-181 (1958).
70. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
71. Id. at 186-87.
72. U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 10.
73. 353 U.S. 533 (1957).
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the Railway Labor Act, which extends to "any carrier by railroad", was ap-
plicable to California's state owned railroad. Employees of the railroad brought
an action against the National Railroad Adjustment Board to compel them
to take jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against the railroad for violation of
a collective bargaining agreement under the Railway Labor Act. The United
States answered supporting the complaint. California, intervening as a party
defendant, opposed the complaint. This was, therefore, a suit prosecuted by
the United States against the State of California and within the judicial power
of the federal courts. Even if the United States had not entered into the action
and the case involved only the employees and the State of California, the federal
court would still have had jurisdiction over the action. As in the Barnard
case, California would have been held to have waived its immunity from suit
by its voluntary intervention in the action as a party defendant and its
submission to that court's jurisdiction. Both cases involving the California
state owned railroad are inapposite. Because Congress intended that all rail-
roads should be subject to the commerce power and amenable to suit in a
federal court by the United States, as in the FSAA and the Railway Labor
Act, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended to condition a state's
constitutional right on its operation of a railroad in interstate commerce.
There is, however, some evidence on which the majority could substan-
tiate its holding that Congress did intend to so condition a state's operation
of a railroad. The all embracing language of the FELA makes the Act appli-
cable to "every common carrier by railroad." The House Report gives further
evidence that Congress intended to subject all railroads to suit. It is stated
that "the bill relates to common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate
commerce. . . . It is intended in its scope to cover all comerce to which
the regulative power of Congress extends. 74 The House Report further states
that "it is thought that the adoption of the rule, as provided in this section,
will be conducive to greater care in the operation of railroads. ' 75 It would
be unusual for Congress to have excluded state owned railroads from ex-
ercising the same care and responsibility as is imposed on privately owned
railroads. In debate on the House floor, Representative Henry exclaimed that
"these changes are in obedience to the demands of humanity, justice, and the
sacred rights of millions of American citizens engaged in hazardous employ-
ment." 76 Should the demands of humanity be less for a state owned and
operated railroad? Could Congress have intended so pointless a result as
creating a right without a remedy? A sovereign immunity exception would
give every privately owned interstate railroad employee an action for damages
74. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908). (Emphasis added.)
75. H.R. R'. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908).
76. 42 CONG. RErc. 4427 (1908).
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but would leave state owned railroad employees without any effective means
of enforcing that liability.
77
DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO SUBJECT A STATE
TO SUIT UNDER THE FELA?
In the California and Taylor cases the Court held that Congress has the
power to regulate state owned railroads. It is also well established that a state
has constitutional immunity from suit by an individual in a federal court with-
out its consent and that Congress cannot deprive a state of this immunity
guaranteed by the eleventh amendment. Therefore, does Congress, in exer-
cising its power to regulate state owned railroads, have the power to require
a state to relinquish its defense of sovereign immunity guaranteed by the
eleventh amendment as a condition to operation of an interstate railroad?
Relying again on the California case, wherein it was said that "the sover-
eign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants
of power to the federal government in the Constitution,"78 the Parden court
held that Alabama had necessarily surrendered a portion of its sovereignty
when it granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. Having
surrendered that portion of its sovereignty which would have prevented a
regulation like the FELA, Alabama is precluded from employing the defense
of sovereign immunity.
79
The Court fails, however, to reconcile this power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce with a state's constitutional immunity from suit by an
individual in a federal court. Although Congress' power to regulate commerce
is complete and plenary, it is not absolute.8 0 It is subject to the limitations
and guarantees of the Constitution."' Among these limitations are those pro-
viding that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures,8 2 that private property may not be taken without just compensation,
8
3
and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.8 4 It is submitted that the eleventh amendment, as supplemented
by Hans, is another limitation guaranteed by the Constitution.
An example of those cases where Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce has been limited by constitutional guarantees is FTC v. American
Tobacco Co. 85 The Federal Trade Commission petitioned for writ of mandamus
77. 377 U.S. at 190.
78. United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 184.
79. 377 U.S. at 192.
80. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1937).
81. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 570-72 (1898).
82. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1923).
83. United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1930).
84. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1949).
85. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. at 306.
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against the American Tobacco Company to require production of records, con-
tracts, memoranda, and correspondence for inspection. The FTC was allegedly
acting in accordance with a federal statute,86 directing the Commission to
prevent the use of unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce. The
Court concluded that the act violated the letter and spirit of the fourth amend-
ment. In Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States,87 a large amount of money
was expended by a company to provide locks and dams along the Monon-
gahela river under express authority from Pennsylvania. Congress, in ex-
ercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce, condemned the property and
appropriated it to its own use. The Court said:
Congress has supreme control over the regulation of commerce, but
if in exercising that supreme control, it deems it necessary to take
private property, then it must proceed subject to the limitation im-
posed by the 5th amendment, and can take only on payment of just
compensation.
88
Congress is, therefore, limited in exercising its grant of power to regulate
interstate commerce by the other provisions in the Constitution. One such
provision in the Constitution is the eleventh amendment and it necessarily
bars Congress from subjecting a state to suit by an individual in a federal
court.
Since Congress does not have the power to subject a state to suit, it
reasonably follows that Congress should not be permitted to impose a condi-
tion on a state which would, if accepted, accomplish indirectly what could not
be accomplished directly. It would seem that Congress does not have the
power to condition a company's engagement in interstate commerce on a
relinquishment of the guarantees under the fourth amendment, namely, pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor could Congress
impose as a condition a company's waiver of just compensation arising under
the fifth amendment. It must, therefore, be equally unconstitutional for Con-
gress to deprive a state of its constitutional immunity from suit as a prerequi-
site to the operation of an interstate railroad.
In analogous situations the Court has held that a state may not impose
conditions on a company's operation within the state that would require
abandonment of a constitutional right secured by the Constitution.89 This
principle was announced in Frost v. Railroad Comm'n,90 wherein it was said:
86. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958).
87. 148 U.S. 312 (1892).
88. Id. at 336.
89. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1925) ; Home Ins. Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1873).
90. 271 U.S. 583 (1925).
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It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the
citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, but to up-
hold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise
of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which
the state threatens otherwise to withhold .... But the power of the
state . . . is not unlimited: and one of the limitations is that it may
not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitu-
tional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one consti-
tutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner,
compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees em-
bedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipu-
lated out of existence. 91
The language used by the Court in Frost is applicable to the Frost case. Since
the Court has recognized that a state legislative body does not have the power
to impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights,
neither should such a power exist in Congress.
CONCLUSION
Although the legislative history and the language of the eleventh amend-
ment clearly indicate the intention to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction
over all cases involving suits by an individual against a state, the rule is not
such an absolute one. A state may consent to suit in a federal court. It may
waive its immunity by voluntarily submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the
court. Furthermore, the amendment does not bar suits brought in federal
courts to enjoin a state official from undertaking to enforce a state statute
which is allegedly unconstitutional, even though the action is recognized as
clearly one against a state.92 And, in Parden, the Court has held that a state
waives its immunity from suit by engaging in an activity, whether govern-
mental or proprietary, which is within the regulative power of Congress. This
line of judicial interpretation has narrowed the applicability of sovereign im-
munity to an extent that the eleventh amendment and the Hans doctrine are
no longer effective as defenses to most suits.
While the Court fails to reconcile the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce with the immunity given states by the eleventh amend-
ment and the Hans doctrine, the Parden majority offers a practical and toler-
able solution to the problem. The Court very aptly points out:
91. Id. at 592.
92. For a detailed survey concerning suits against a state officer, see Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963);




To read a "sovereign immunity exception" into the Act would result,
moreover, in a right without a remedy; it would mean that Congress
made "every" interstate railroad liable in damages to injured em-
ployees but left one class of such employees-those whose employers
happen to be state-owned-without any effective means of enforcing
that liability. We are unwilling to conclude that Congress intended so
pointless and frustrating a result.93
The constant chipping away at the eleventh amendment and the Hans
doctrine indicates the non-feasibility of such an immunity today where more
and more activities, once reserved for private enterprise, have become domina-
ted by state agencies. The concept of "governmental immunity" evolved from
an era where the state was limited in its activity. Although the Court seemingly
does not rely on the governmental-proprietary distinction as a basis for im-
posing liability, it is submitted that this was an underlying consideration of
the Parden majority. Once a state undertakes an activity, heretofore private
in nature, it should be subjected to the same restrictions and regulations as
any individual. The governmental-proprietary distinction, however, should
not be the sole or determining factor. If an activity comes within the regulative
power of the state or federal government, it matters not whether the actor
be a state or an individual. Coming within the realm of regulation subjects
the actor to suit.
JOSEPH T. MESSINA
93. 377 U.S. at 190.
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